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The plaintiffs-appellants file this reply brief in 
response to the defendants-respondents' disingenuous attempts to 
sustain the judgment below approving a Family Settlement Agreement 
pursuant to §§ 75-3-1101 and 1102 of the Uniform Probate Code, 
The defendants in their attempt to preserve the judgment below: 
(1) have switched positions by now claiming court approval of the 
FSA was not required; (2) now feel compelled to attack the valid-
ity of Mr. Grimm's spendthrift trust although the defendants did 
not propose and the court did not find the trust was invalid; (3) 
assert the lower court properly determined Maxine's claim for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and properly denied 
her a jury trial/ although the lower court never adjudicated her 
claim; and (4) repeatedly engage in the miscitation and misleading 
citation of record and authority that not only fail to sustain the 
defendants* positions but cast a pale over the basic credibility 
of their brief. 
I. 
THE DEFENDANTS HAVE ABANDONED THE FOUNDATION OF THE 
LOWER COURTS JUDGMENT — COURT APPROVAL OF THE FSA, 
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE FSA IS CONTROLLED BY §§ 1101 
AND 1102 NOT § 912, COURT APPROVAL IS REQUIRED TO BIND 
-PARTIES AND NONPARTIES" AND AN FSA MATERIALLY ALTER-
ING OR TERMINATING AN INTER VIVOS SPENDTHRIFT TRUST IS 
INVALID WITHOUT COURT APPROVAL UNDER §§ 1101 AND 1102. 
A. The Defendants Have Abandoned the Need for Court Approval of 
the FSA Pursuant to $$ 1101 and 1102. 
The defendants have abandoned the foundation of the lower 
court's judgment — the need for court approval of the Family 
Settlement Agreement (FSA) pursuant to the Uniform Probate Code. 
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-1101, 1102. The foundation of the lower 
court's Judgment was the court's approval of the FSA. Simply look 
at the Judgment and Conclusions of the court. (CR. 1233-1231, CR. 
1258-1256). 
The reason for the defendants' abandonment is apparent. 
The plaintiffs' position both below and in this Court is the FSA 
under §§ 1101 and 1102 was not binding prior to court approval and 
subject to repudiation. (App. Br. at 7-8, 39-43). The plain-
tiffs' position is supported by the plain language of § 1101, 
precedent and public policy. 
Section 1101 plainly provides: Ha compromise of any 
controversy . . . , if approved in a formal proceeding in the 
court for that purpose, is binding on the parties thereto, includ-
ing those unborn, unascertained or who could not be located." 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1101 (emphasis supplied). Under the plain 
language of § 1101 and the approval structure of § 1102, a FSA is 
only binding upon court approval and subject to repudiation prior 
to court approval. 
Precedent supports the plain language of § 1101 and 
uniformly holds settlement agreements subject to court approval 
are not binding and are subject to repudiation at any time prior 
to court approval. (See cases cited App. Br. at 40). The 
defendants do not dispute this Rule and they have not cited one 
case to the contrary. (Res. Br. at 44-45). 
The only argument advanced by the defendants is that 
there is no public policy supporting the plain legislative 
direction that a Family Settlement Agreement shall only be binding 
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upon court approval. The defendants are wrong. The defendants 
ignore the legislative choice that the desires of the testator — 
the desires of Mr. Grimm — are entitled to deference. That 
policy is reflected in the Editorial Board Comment to §§ 1101 and 
1102. The Editorial Board Comment states in material part, "The 
only reason for approving a scheme of devolution which differs 
from that framed by the testator . . . is to prevent dissipation 
of the estate in wasteful litigation . . . . A controversy which 
the court may find to be in good faith, as well as the concurrence 
of all beneficially interested and competent persons and parent 
representatives provide prerequisites which should prevent the 
procedure from being abused." Editorial Board Comment, 
§§ 75-3-1101, 1102 (emphasis supplied). Tfhe public policy is to 
respect the desires of the testator in the absence of the concur-
rence of his intended beneficiaries and the approval of the 
court. Without the prerequisites, concurrence and approval, the 
testator's wishes should control. Holding that a FSA is not bind-
ing prior to court approval and is subject to repudiation not only 
adheres to the plain language of the statute, but supports the 
public policy of deferring to the testator's desires without the 
concurrence of his intended beneficiariesj 
The defendants now take the position that court approval 
of the FSA is not required in order to make the FSA a binding 
agreement. (Respondent's Brief (Res. Br.) at 40-47). The 
defendants' new position is that the enforceability of the FSA is 
controlled by § 75-3-912 and not §§ 75-3-1101 and 1102. Section 
912 does not require court approval. Sections 1101 and 1102 do. 
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Obviously/ the defendants by changing their position implicitly 
acknowledge that if the provisions of §§ 1101 and 1102 are con-
trolling and court approval is required, the FSA is not binding 
and subject to repudiation prior to court approval. 
The defendants have switched statutory horses in the 
middle of the stream. The position the defendants take now is not 
the position the defendants took below. In the lower court the 
defendants took the position that court approval of the FSA pur-
suant to §§ 1101 and 1102 was necessary and the court could 
approve the FSA despite plaintiffs' repudiation. (See Conclusions 
Nos. 8 and 9, CR. 1232-1231). The district court adopted the 
defendants' position. Indeed, the rationale of the lower court's 
decision denying the plaintiffs the right to jury trial on the 
issues of duress and failure of consideration was the court's view 
that the court could determine the validity of the FSA pursuant to 
§ 1102. There is no question that that is what the court did. 
The lower court approved the FSA pursuant to §§ 1101 and 1102. 
(See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nos. 70A, 8 and 9, 
CR. 1234, 1232, 1231). Indeed, the defendants concede that in 
their brief — the court "formally approved the FSA pursuant to 
§ 75-3-1102." (Res. Br. 40). 
The defendants thus seek to sustain the Judgment of the 
lower court approving the FSA on the ground court approval was not 
required. The defendants not only seek to sustain the lower 
court's Judgment contrary to their position below, but the lower 
court made absolutely no findings and entered no conclusions with 
regard to the applicability of § 912. 
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B. The Court Approval Provisions of §§ 1101 and 1102 Are Compre-
hensive and Control The Enforceability of Any FSA Compromis-
ing a Claim Relative to an Interest in The Decedent's Estate. 
The Need for Court Approval Does Not Turn on a "Partv-Non 
Party" Distinction and The UPC Simply Does Not Divide The 
Issue of Enforceability of an FSA Compromise Between §§ 1101 
gnfl 11Q2 and § 912, 
Beyond the defendants volte-face, the dispositive point 
is that the defendants are wrong. Sections 1101 and 1102, not 
§ 912, are controlling. The defendants' abandonment is of no 
avail. Court approval under §§ 1101 and 1102 was necessary to 
make this FSA a binding settlement agreement under the Uniform 
Probate Code. 
Sections 1101 and 1102 mandate court approval and a pro-
cedure for court approval for the compromise of all claims rela-
tive to any interest in a decedent's estate. Section 912 author-
izes agreements among competent successors to alter the division 
of a decedent's estate. Section 912, however, is limited to 
agreements "to alter the interest, shares, or amounts" to which 
the parties are entitled under the decedent's will or the laws of 
intestacy. Section 912, as the Editorial Comment notes, simply 
permits those who are entitled to a share in the decedent's estate 
to alter the division of the estate among themselves. If, for 
instance, the deceased has left a codicil to a will that is 
clearly invalid but evidences an intent by the deceased to alter 
the distribution of his estate from his will, his devisees may 
agree among themselves to honor the invalid codicil. That, 
indeed, is exactly what happened in the Matter of Estate of Cruse, 
710 P.2d 733 (N.M. 1985). The agreement altering the division of 
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the deceased's estate does not have to involve the settlement of 
any controversy or any claim. It may simply involve a redistribu-
tion of the decedent's property among the intended beneficiaries. 
A settlement agreement, however, involves more than an agreement 
to alter the division of the decedent's estate. It involves the 
settlement of controversies and claims of rights or interests in 
the decedent's estate. It involves an agreement reached in an 
adversary setting and generally involves both the release of 
claims and a redistribution of the decedent's estate, frequently 
to persons who were clearly not the intended beneficiaries of the 
decedent. It is the potential for the abuse of the testator's 
desires through the advancement of spurious and malicious claims 
that warrants the court approval provisions of §§ 1101 and 1102. 
Any settlement compromising any claim of right or inter-
est in a decedent's estate is subject to the court approval pro-
visions of §§ 1101 and 1102. Simply, those sections are the pro-
visions of the Uniform Probate Code applicable to the compromise 
of claims in a decedent's estate. That is what the statute says 
— "a compromise of any controversy . . . " ( § 1101) — "The terms 
of the compromise shall be set forth in an agreement in writing 
which shall be executed by all competent persons . . . having 
beneficial interest or having claims which will or may be affected 
by the compromise." (§ 1102). This Court indeed has stated that 
settlement agreements compromising claims must be approved under 
the court approval provisions of §§ 1101 and 1102. In the Matter 
of the Estate of Frank Chasel, 42 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Sept. 15, 
1986). In Chasel this Court said in part:: 
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Compromise agreements authorized by Part 11 of the 
Probate Code must be approved in formal proceed-
ings . Section 75-3-1101 . . . except for the 
requirement of court approval and other statutory 
requirements in Part 11 a compromise agreement 
under the Probate Code is like other compromise 
agreements.1 
Id. at 4. 
The court approval provisions of §§ 1101 and 1102 are thus compre-
hensive insofar as they apply to the settlement of claims in a 
decedent's estate and reflect a policy that before the desires of 
the testator are altered based on the settlement of a claim in 
which all interested parties concur, a court still must be 
satisfied that there was a good faith claim controversy. 
Certainly, §§ 1101 and 1102 are not meaningless. Even 
the defendants recognize that. (Res. Br. at 42). The defendants, 
however, in an attempt to take this FSA out of the court approval 
requirements of §§ 1101 and 1102 argue that the Uniform Probate 
Code divides the issue of enforceability of family settlement 
agreements between § 912 and §§ 1101 and 1102. Literally, the 
defendants' position is that family settlement agreements are made 
binding under two separate statutory provisions. The defendants 
J^-The defendants' citation In re Estate of Thompson, 601 P.2d 
1105 (Kansas 1979) to refute the plaintiffs' hypothetical based on 
Chasel — if William Chasel had found the new will prior to court 
approval of the settlement agreement, he could have repudiated the 
settlement agreement — is a plain misstatement of authority. 
Indeed, contrary to the defendants' argument, in Thompson as well 
as in Chasel, the court had already approved the family settlement 
agreement prior to the discovery of the new will and that is 
precisely why the court refused to set aside the settlement 
agreement. Id. at 1108 (emphasis supplied), 
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contend that family settlement agreements become binding upon 
parties to the FSA without court approval under § 912, but that 
the court approval provisions of §§ 1101 and 1102 are necessary 
and only necessary to make family settlement agreements binding on 
"nonparties"/ such as minors, unascertained heirs and inalienable 
interest. (Res. Br. at 43-47). The defendants thus take the 
position that there is a "party-nonparty" distinction with regard 
to the enforcement of family settlement agreements. 
The defendants rely on In re Peck's Estate. 34 N.W. 2d 
533 (Mich. 1948) to support their "party-nonparty" division of 
enforceability between § 912 and §§ 1101 and 1102. The problem 
with the defendants' position is that In re Peck's Estate does not 
do that. Indeed, In re Peck's Estate establishes that the statu-
tory evolution of §§ 1101/ 1102 and 912 of the Uniform Probate 
Code provides no basis for the defendants' "party-nonparty" 
distinction/ and/ on the contrary/ establishes §§ 1101 and 1102 
are controlling. 
In In re Peck's Estate, the defendants are correct that 
the court did uphold the enforceability of a settlement agreement 
that had not been approved by a Probate Court. The defendants are 
correct that the Court held that court approval was not necessary 
because there were no minors/ unknown heirs or inalienable inter-
est involved in the settlement. What the defendants do not point 
out to the court and what absolutely distinguishes In re Peck's 
Estate is the Michigan statute that was applicable to the In re 
Peck's Estate decision. 
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The controlling Michigan statute in In re Peck's Estate 
provided in material part: 
Subject to the rights of creditors and taxing 
authorities/ competent interested parties may 
agree among themselves to alter the interest, 
shares, or amounts to which they are entitled 
under the will of the decedent or under the laws 
of intestacy, in any way that they provide in a 
written agreement executed by all who are affected 
by its provisions. When there is, or may be, an 
interested party to the agreement who is a minor 
or incapacitated person or where there is an 
inalienable estate or future contingent interest, 
after notice to the representative of such person 
or interest as provided by supreme court rule, the 
probate court having jurisdiction of the matter 
may, if the agreement is made in good faith and 
gppegrg just gnd reasonable for thg person or 
interest, direct the representative of the person 
or interest to sign and enter into the agreement. 
(See MSA § 27-5191, emphasis supplied). 
The reason the court held in In re Peck's Estate there was no 
necessity for court approval of a settlement agreement where there 
were no minors or inalienable interest is that the plain language 
of the statute required that distinction, the Michigan statute 
explicitly limited the need for court approval to settlement 
agreements where there were minors, incapacitated persons or 
inalienable interests. Id. 
The 1948 Michigan statute controlling In re Peck's Estate 
is clearly and materially different from the Uniform Probate 
Code. The Uniform Probate Code was adopted in 1969. Section 912 
of the Uniform Probate Code does have the first sentence of the 
Michigan statute but does not have the sentence of that statute 
limiting the need for court approval to agreements that affect "a 
minor or incapacitated person or where there is an inalienable 
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estate . . . .M The Michigan statute, moreover, did not have 
provisions comparable to §§ 1101 and 1102 of the Uniform Probate 
Code, For this purpose §§ 1101 and 1102 expanded the need for 
court approval of settlement agreements from settlement agreements 
that only affected minors/ incapacitated persons or inalienable 
interests to the need for court approval of all settlement 
agreements compromising claims relative to an interest in a 
decedent's estate before such agreements became binding on parties 
and nonparties alike. This conclusion is established (1) by the 
deletion from § 912 of the limited court approval provision of the 
Michigan statute; (2) by the addition of two new comprehensive 
court approval provisions to the Uniform Probate Code - - §§ 1101 
and 1102; and (3) the plain language of § 1101 and the approval 
structure of § 1102 that mandate court approval of all settlement 
agreements relative to claims in a decedent's estate before such 
compromises become binding on "parties and nonparties" alike. 
The plain language of § 1101 again supports this con-
clusion. The defendants' new position simply ignores the phrase 
"is binding on all the parties thereto." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-1101. The approval structure of § 1102, moreover, rein-
forces the plain language of § 1101. Section 1102 requires that 
"the terms of the compromise shall be set forth in agreement in 
writing which shall be executed by all competent persons . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1102. Section 1102 thus by its approval 
structure envisages that settlement agreements, the enforceability 
of which are conditioned on court approval pursuant to § 1101/ 
will be settlement agreements "executed by all competent persons", 
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not just settlement agreements pertaining to minors, unborn heirs 
or inalienable interests. In short, the defendants' 
"party-nonparty" distinction for the need for court approval 
simply defies the evolution, plain language and approval structure 
of §§ 1101 and 1102 of the Uniform Probate Code. 
C. Court Approval of This FSA is Unquestionably Required Because 
This FSA Materially Alters and Terminates an Inter Vivos 
Spendthrift Trust and Without Court Approval Such an FSA Even 
With The Consent of All Beneficiaries Would Be Invalid, 
Certainly §§ 1101 and 1102 of the Uniform Probate Code 
are applicable to this Family Settlement Agreement. (PX. 58-59). 
This Family Settlement Agreement not only alters the division of 
Mr. Grimm's estate contrary to his desires in favor of Ethel and 
Nita and compromises their "claims" and their mother, Juanita 
Kegley Grimm's, "claims", but this FSA materially alters and term-
inates Mr. Grimm's inter vivos spendthrift trust. (See, App. Br. 
at 45-46). 
The unchallenged rule is that beneficiaries of a trust 
may not materially alter or terminate a trust if such termina-
tion or alteration would frustrate a material purpose of the trust 
and this rule has uniformly been applied to preclude the material 
alteration or termination of a spendthrift trust. (See 4 Scott on 
Trusts, § 337.2 and App. Br. at 43-47). The consequence of this 
rule is that without court approval an FSA materially altering and 
terminating a spendthrift trust would be invalid and unenforceable 
regardless of repudiation. (App. Br. at 43-47). The absurdity of 
the defendants' new position is if there is no statutory basis for 
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court approval of this FSA — if this FSA is not subject to court 
approval under §§ 1101 and 1102, this FSA would be invalid regard-
less of the plaintiffs' repudiation simply because it materially 
alters and terminates Mr. Grimm's trust. (Compare PX. 58 and 59 
with PX. 11). 
The plaintiffs in their opening brief have pointed out to 
the Court that there is a substantial body of authority that holds 
that even in the context of the Uniform Probate Code, courts will 
not approve FSA agreements materially altering or terminating a 
spendthrift trust on the ground that to do so would frustrate the 
testator's purpose in establishing an inalienable interest for his 
intended beneficiaries. (See cases cited App. Br. at 44-45). The 
plaintiffs in their opening brief acknowledged that the 
Restatement has adopted a modified rule. The Restatement takes 
the position that under § 75-3-1101 a court can approve a compro-
mise materially altering or terminating a spendthrift trust if the 
court finds it was '•in the best interests of the trust benefic-
iaries. " See Restatement (Second) of Trusts, comment O (1959) and 
App. Br. at 46. But clearly court approval is essential and the 
only provision giving the court authority to approve an FSA 
materially altering or terminating a spendthrift trust is §§ 1101 
and 1102 of the Uniform Probate Code. Section 1101 has language 
explicitly dealing with the court's power to approve an FSA 
materially altering or terminating a spendthrift trust — MAn 
approved compromise is binding even though it may affect a trust 
or an inalienable interest." 
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The statutory history of § 912# moreover makes it clear 
that compromises materially altering or terminating a spendthrift 
trust are subject to the court approval provisions of §§ 1101 and 
1102. Specifically/ the Michigan statute applicable in In re 
Peck's Estate shows on its face that the power with regard to in-
alienable interest covered by the second sentence of that statute 
has been transferred in the Uniform Probate Code to §§ 1101 and 
1102. (See Br. supra, at 9). 
D. The Lower Court Made No Findings With Regard To The Validity 
of Mry Grimm's Trust <*nd His Trust« Contrary tQ The 
Defendants' Hew Position on Appeal, is Valid, 
The defendants in a desperate attempt to wriggle out of 
the consequences of the plaintiffs' repudiation of the FSA prior 
to court approval, now attempt to rewrite the record below by 
claiming Mr. Grimm's inter vivos spendthrift trust was invalid. 
(Res. Br. at 52-56). The defendants in their brief now claim (1) 
"The lower court was correct in concluding that the alleged spend-
thrift trust did not affect the validity of the FSA-/ and (2) Mr. 
Grimm's trust was invalid. (See Point II# Res. Br. at 53-55). 
The lower court made no findings and entered no conclu-
sions with regard to the validity of Mr. Grimm's inter vivos 
spendthrift trust and made no determination that his trust did not 
affect the validity of the Family Settlement Agreement or the 
ability of the court to approve it. (See Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law# CR. 1254-1231). Indeed/ one of the deficien-
cies of the lower court's judgment that the plaintiffs claimed as 
error in their opening brief was "The court made no findings with 
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regard to the validity of the trust or its creation.- (App. Br. 
at 66). The court, moreover, made no finding and entered no con-
clusion that the material alteration and termination of Mr. 
Grimm's trust was in the interest of his intended beneficiaries — 
o 
Maxine, Pete and Linda. Simply, in summary, the lower court 
made no determination or analysis of any type of the impact of Mr. 
Grimm's trust in relationship to the court's approval of the FSA. 
Defendants now take the position that Mr. Grimm's trust 
was invalid on the grounds (1) it was illusory, (2) it contained 
-few- assets, and (3) that under a valid spendthrift trust a bene-
ficiary may only receive income and not the corpus0 (Res. Br. at 
53-55). The defendants further argue that even if the trust is 
valid, the plaintiffs have renounced their interest in the trust 
and in any event the FSA terminating the trust is in the best 
interests of the trust beneficiaries. The kindest thing to say 
about the defendants' position is that they are undeterred either 
by the facts, the law or the lower court's failure to make any 
findings or conclusions supporting their position. 
Mr. Grimm's trust was not illusory or invalid. Utah has 
followed the rules of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts with 
regard to issues of validity. Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 
2Maxine, Pete and Linda were the primary beneficiaries of 
Mr. Grimm's Trust. The LDS Church, however, was a contingent 
beneficiary. The LDS Church was not a party to the Family 
Settlement Agreement and there was no proof that the LDS Church 
had any notice of any petition by the defendants to obtain court 
approval of the Family Settlement Agreement. (See PX. 11 at 7). 
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181 (Utah 1981)• This Court has held following the Restatement 
that an inter vivos trust is created "when a settlor with the 
intent to create a trust transfers property to a trustee in trust 
for, or declares that he . . • holds specific property in trust 
for, a named beneficiary." Sundquist v. Sundguist, supra, at 183. 
The defendants1 argument that Mr. Grimm's trust is illus-
ory is predicated on the trustor's reservation of a power of revo-
cation. (See PX. 11 at 11). The defendants rely solely on 
Alexander v. Zions Savings Bank & Trust Co., 273 P.2d 173 (Utah 
1954), to support their position. Contrary to the defendants' 
position, the rule in Utah and the rule of the Restatement is the 
reservation of a power of revocation in the trustor of an inter 
vivos trust does not render the trust illusory or invalidate the 
trust. Horn v. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., 548 P.2d 1265 
(Utah 1976); Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §§ 37, 57. The 
Alexander case is not in point. Indeed, this Court has explicitly 
held that it is not in point. Horn v. First Security Bank of 
Utah, N.A., supra, at 1266. If the defendants had felt the need 
to call controlling authority contrary to their position to the 
Court's attention, they would have pointed out that in the Horn 
case in which this Court uneguivocally held the reservation of a 
power of revocation does not invalidate aft inter vivos trust, this 
Court said with regard to the Alexander case: "The case does not 
stand for the proposition that the reservation by the settlor of 
the right of revocation or the right to amend the trust made the 
same either testamentary or illusory." id. at 1266. 
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The defendants' second argument attacking the trust is 
that Mr. Griram did not transfer any, or at least very many, assets 
to his trust. (Res. Br. at 54). The defendants' position is not 
supported by the facts or the lower court's findings. (See App. 
Br. at 15-16; Findings Nos. 14, 16 and 17, CR. 1251-1250). At the 
time Mr. Grimm executed his trust he transferred all of his stock 
in Globe Investment Company to the trust. The transfer of the 
Globe Investment stock to his trust was established by a Bill of 
Sale attached to the original trust agreement transferring all of 
his Globe stock (PX. 11); the stock ledgers of Globe Investment 
Company reflecting that transfer and the issuance of a new stock 
certificate to Mr. Grimm's Trustee (PX. 12); the new Globe stock 
certificate issued and delivered to Mr. Grimm's trustee (PX. 13); 
and the uncontradicted testimony of Pete, Maxine and LaVar Tate 
that Mr. Grimm signed and delivered the Bill of Sale and stock 
certificates in Globe to the trustee, Pete, at the time Mr. Grimm 
executed his trust. (TRA. 45-6, TRB. 441-42, 666-67). 
The court's findings do not dispute these facts. The 
court's finding relating to the transfer of the Globe stock is set 
forth in Finding No. 14. (CR. 1251). One of the misleading 
things that the defendants have done is to confuse the transfer of 
the Globe stock in July of 1977 and the assignment of other secur-
ities that were transferred by Mr. Grimm in August and September 
of 1977 when he returned to the Philippines. (See Res. Br. at 
54). With regard to the transfer of the Globe stock in July the 
court found, "The only assets purportedly transferred to the 
trustee were the shares of Globe Investment Company". (Finding 
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No. 14, CR. 1251). MPurportedlyM is not much of a finding. It 
certainly, however, is not a finding that Mr. Grimm did not trans-
fer the Globe stock to his trust in July of 1977, and the fact 
that Mr. Grimm transferred the Globe stock is uncontroverted and, 
indeed, unchallenged by the defendants. The execution of the 
trust and the transfer and delivery of the Globe stock would, of 
course, alone create a valid inter vivos trust. Sundguist v. 
Sunflqyiist/ supra. 
Mr. Grimm also transferred numerous additional assets to 
his trust in August and September of 1977 after he returned to the 
Philippines. Each one of the transfers was reflected in a written 
assignment signed by Mr. Grimm and notarised by Judge Tiongson. 
(PX. 14-55; TRB. 444, 449-450). Each one of the assignments was 
delivered by Mr. Grimm to Pete as trustee of the trust. (TRB. 
450, 448-49; TRA. 52-53). The evidence that Mr. Grimm executed 
each one of the written assignments and delivered each one of the 
written assignments to his trustee was uncontroverted. 
The lower court in Finding No. 17 (CR. 1250) in part 
found: "It is questionable if the assignments were in fact 
properly delivered to the Trustee because PETE testified that he 
placed the assignments in his dad's safety deposit box which was 
in the name of E. M. Grimm." "Questionable" again is not much of 
a finding. The finding, however, does not dispute the fact that 
the assignments were executed and delivered. Where Mr. Grimm's 
trustee placed the assignments after delivery is of no signifi-
cance in terms of the transfer of the property covered by the 
assignments to the trust. 
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The defendants' position that to effect a transfer of 
corporate stock to a trust there must be a delivery of the stock 
certificate is not supported by the authority the defendants 
cite. (See Res. Br. at 54). The defendants' quotation from 
Boaert on Trusts (not "Bogart") cited by the defendant speaks for 
itself. Id. On the contrary, the cases hold that a transfer of 
corporate stock by gift may be effected by a written assignment 
and the delivery of the assignment without delivery of the corpor-
ate stock certificate. See, e.g., Kintzinaer v. Millin, 117 
N.W.2d 68, 76 (Iowa 1962); Home for Destitute Crippled Children v. 
Boomer, 31 N.E.2d 812, 821 (Ill.App. 1941); In re Spain's Estate, 
46 N.Y.S.2d 789, 791 (Sup.Ct. 1944). Delivery of the assignment 
is sufficient. Id. 
In this case that is what Mr. Grimm did. He executed a 
written assignment, he delivered the assignment to his trustee, 
Pete, and with regard to the assignments that related to transfers 
of corporate stock, he specifically in the assignments referred to 
the numbers of the stock certificates and total shares covered by 
each assignment. (See, e.g., PX. 15, 16, 17, 18 & 19). In the 
case of Far East Molasses Corporation, for instance, the 
assignment related to share certificates Nos. 8, 12, 18, 25, 35, 
41 and 48, totalling 31,128 shares. (PX. 19). 
Section 70A-8-309 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the 
predecessor provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act do not 
change the requirements for the effectuation of an inter vivos 
gift of corporate stock. The courts have held that this provision 
of the Commercial Code does not change the common law rule and 
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does not require the delivery of the stock certificate. 
Kintzinaer v. Millin, supra: Home for Destitute Crippled Children 
v. Boomer, supra: Zaharion v. Security National Bank, 290 N.W.2d 
84 (Mich.App. 1980). The courts have interpreted this provision 
of the Commercial Code as only dealing with the requirements for 
the protection of the corporation/ for instance, in the payment of 
dividends: 
We have held corporate stock may be transferred, 
as between the parties, by written assignment 
thereof without manual delivery of the stock 
certificates. 
. . . although some decisions ar^ to the contrary 
by what we think is the weight of authority which 
we are persuaded to follow, the rights of the 
parties as between themselves are not affected by 
the provisions of the Uniform Act. They were 
enacted for the protection of the corporation, so 
it might safely deal in payment of dividends or 
otherwise with the person in whose name the stock 
was registered. 
Kintzinaer v. Millin, supra, at 75, 76. 
In summary, in the case of the Globe stock, Mr. Grimm effectuated 
a transfer of stock in Globe not only by Assignment and delivery 
of the Bill of Sale but by the issuance and delivery of a new 
stock certificate in Globe in the name of the trustee to his 
trustee. The execution of the trust and the transfer of the Globe 
stock would, of course, alone create a va^id inter vivos trust 
that could not be materially altered or terminated without court 
approval, but Mr. Grimm also validly transferred the property 
covered by written assignments that were executed and delivered by 
him to his trustee. (PX. 14-55). The trpst was valid and the 
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property that Mr. Grimm intended to transfer to the trust was 
properly and validly transferred. 
The defendants further argue that Mr. Grimm's trust is 
not a valid spendthrift trust because the trustee has the discre-
tion to invade the corpus of the trust for Maxine's maintenance 
and support. The defendants rely solely on the 1931 case Rose v. 
Southern Michigan Nat. Bank, 238 N.W. 284 (Mich. 1931), overruled. 
In re Edgar Estate, 389 N.W. 2d 696 (Mich. 1986). The defendants' 
reliance on Rose displays a lack of candor. The shepardization of 
Rose discloses the defendants have failed to call to the Court's 
attention Preminger v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 220 N.W.2d, 795 
(Mich. App. 1974). Preminger explicitly discusses the Rose 
decision and squarely holds contrary to the defendants' position 
that a spendthrift trust that grants the trustee the dis-
cretionary power to invade the corpus of the trust for the support 
and maintenance of the trust beneficiaries is a valid spendthrift 
trust. Id. In Preminger there was a family settlement agreement 
terminating a spendthrift trust that required court approval 
before it became a binding FSA. The spendthrift trust contained a 
provision giving the trustee the power in the trustee's discretion 
to invade the corpus for the support and maintenance of the trust 
beneficiaries. The proponents of the family settlement agreement 
claimed the trust was not a valid spendthrift trust under the Rose 
decision because the beneficiaries had more than a gift "only of 
income" and the trustee had the discretion to invade the corpus of 
the trust for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries. The Court 
held that the trust was a valid spendthrift trust regardless of 
-20-
the discretion of the trustee and refused to approve the FSA on 
the ground that the termination of a valid spendthrift trust would 
frustrate a material purpose of the trustor. 
Undeterred by their inadequate attacks on the validity of 
Mr. Grimm's spendthrift trust, the defendants alternately seek to 
avoid the consequence of the trust's validity by (1) arguing that 
the plaintiffs have renounced their interest in the trust; and (2) 
arguing if they haven't renounced their interest in the trust, the 
FSA terminating the spendthrift trust can be approved by this 
Court as being in the plaintiffs' best interests. (Res. Br. at 
55-59). It is difficult to keep track of all of the defendants' 
arguments to avoid the plaintiffs' repudiation and the need for 
court approval of the FSA materially altering and terminating a 
spendthrift trust, but the defendants' arguments with regard to 
renouncement and best interests of the plaintiffs are some of 
their most disingenuous positions. First, there are absolutely no 
findings or conclusions with regard to any renunciation of the 
trust or the plaintiffs' "best interests." No such findings or 
conclusions exist. (CR. 1254-1231). Beyond that small hurdle, 
the plaintiffs never renounced their interest in the trust. There 
is no evidence of that. The defendants in their brief on the 
claim of renunciation cite the provisions of the Uniform Probate 
Code. (Res. Br. at 55). What the defendants don't point out to 
the Court is that insofar as the provisions of the Uniform Probate 
Code deal with renunciation, § 75-2-801 requires that renunciation 
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be Ha written renunciation.- Section 75-2-801. There is, of 
course, no exhibit and no evidence of any such written 
renunciation. 
As far as the FSA being in the plaintiffs* best interests 
— that is hardly so. How could an FSA derived from perjured 
petitions, burglaries and threats be in the plaintiffs best 
interests? But simply in economic terms, the FSA was not in the 
plaintiffs' best interests. Ethel and Nita received over 
$1,000,000.00 more under the FSA than their father intended them 
to have. They increased their share from 3.7% of Mr. Grimm's 
estate to 25%. Under the FSA, assets Mr. Grimm placed in trust 
for the care and maintenance of Maxine were transferred and redis-
tributed to Ethel and Nita. Under the FSA, Maxine instead of 
getting a marital share tax free had her share subject to the pay-
ment of taxes and expenses. (PX. 58 at 8). Finally, Ethel and 
Nita under the FSA not only got over six times the amount their 
father intended, they received substantially more than Pete and 
Linda. (See App. Br. with citations at 27-28). 
E. The Plaintiffs Were Not Equitably Estopped From Repudiating 
The FSA When The Defendants As A Matter of Their Own Choice 
Failed to Seek Court Approval For Over Six Years. 
The defendants, faced with the clear consequence of their 
failure to obtain court approval of the FSA prior to the plain-
tiffs' repudiation, attempt to throw in the kitchen sink to hold 
on to the FSA by resorting to a claim that the plaintiffs were 
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equitably estopped from repudiating the FS^. (Res. Br, at 
47-53)• The answer to the defendants' barnyard equity attack on 
the plaintiffs' repudiation is not only that the assertions 
supporting the attack are untrue and misleading, but the attack 
simply fails to embody the material elements of an equitable 
estoppel barring the plaintiffs from repudiation. 
The defendants themselves are solely responsible for 
their failure to obtain court approval of the FSA. The first 
material element of any equitable estoppel is there must be some 
statement or action on which the parties claiming estoppel relied 
to their injury. Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control, 602 
P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). The plaintiffs in this case, however, did 
not say or do anything to prevent the defendants from seeking 
court approval. David Salisbury was the defendants' witness. 
(TRB. 72). Mr. Salisbury unequivocally testified he never did 
anything to prevent the defendants from filing the FSA for court 
approval. (TRB. 272). Rex Roberts testified his lawyer, Donald 
3The defendants also rely on court Conclusions Nos. 6 and 7 
with regard to waiver and ratification. The court's Conclusions 
with regard to waiver and ratification have absolutely nothing to 
do with the plaintiffs' right of repudiation. The court's 
Conclusions with regard to waiver and ratification, while wholly 
conclusory, relate solely to grounds the plaintiffs had to set 
aside the FSA "at the time of its execution." (Conclusions Nos. 6 
and 7, CR. 1232). Grounds to set aside the FSA at the time of its 
execution do not relate to the plaintiffs' right to repudiate the 
FSA, which right the plaintiffs had after the execution of the FSA 
and prior to court approval. Waiver or ratification would no more 
avoid the need for court approval than the execution of the FSA 
itself. Consensual acts by the parties simply cannot avoid the 
statutory requirement of court approval. 
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Holbrook, advised him to file the FSA. (TRB. 994). The plain-
tiffs simply did nothing to prevent the defendants from obtaining 
court approval of the FSA prior to repudiation. Indeed, any claim 
the defendants relied on the plaintiffs in their failure to seek 
court approval of the FSA is conclusively contradicted by the 
defendants total failure to even attempt to obtain court approval 
of the FSA until February 13, 1985, almost five years after the 
plaintiffs' clear and unequivoval repudiation and over four years 
after this action was commenced. (See App. Br. at 6-8 with 
citations). 
The defendants claim the defendants suffered injury by 
reason of the defendants' acts in conformity with and reliance on 
the FSA is absolutely untrue. Ethel and Nita have already 
received every dime that they were entitled to under Mr. Grimm's 
estate plan. The uncontroverted evidence in this case shows under 
Mr. Grimm's estate plan, his two wills and his trust, Ethel and 
Nita were to each receive $96,423.00. (PX. 169B). In fact, Ethel 
and Nita have each received $100,000.00 in cash (TRA. 358, DX. 
229), to say nothing about the gold and pearls they retained from 
the property and valuables that Ethel and Rex took from Maxine's 
home. (TRB. 936, 937). In short, the FSA did not prejudice 
Ethel's and Nita's financial position. 
The defendants were not prejudiced from asserting any 
claim for more to Mr. Grimm's estate. They did not have any bona 
fide claims. (See Br. infra at 38-43). The FSA, however, did not 
deter them from asserting any claim regardless of its validity. 
The defendants could have asserted any claim to Mr. Grimm's estate 
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they wanted to in the lower court. There was nothing to prevent 
the defendants from claiming in the alternative that if the FSA 
was subject to repudiation or invalid/ that they were entitled to 
a claim for more than Mr. Grimm wanted to give them under his 
estate plan. The defendants could have claimed that Mr. Grimm's 
marriage to Maxine was invalid/ that his trust was invalid/ that 
he was incompetent or that they were compulsory heirs under the 
law of legitime. They could have made those claims below but they 
did not do so. Clearly# they did not make those claims because 
there was no merit to any of them. But the plaintiffs did not 
prevent them from making those claims. Tl^ e FSA did not prejudice 
their legal position. 
The further claims the defendants make in their brief of 
injury by reason of their compliance with the FSA are untrue or 
misleading: (a) The defendants claim they were injured because 
under the FSA they agreed to the filing of a Philippine tax return 
excluding the Everett Steamship receivable and the Globe stock as 
Philippine assets. The filing of a Philippine tax return did not 
prejudice the defendants* interest in Mr. Grimm's estate. The 
defendants confuse taxation with inheritance. Mr. Grimm did not 
distribute all of his personal property under his Philippine 
Will. (Compare PX. 7 with PX. 6). Under Mr. Grimm's Philippine 
Will/ Mr. Grimm only gifted his personal property "which is 
situated in the Philippine Islands." (PX. 7). Globe was a U.S. 
corporation and its business and stock were located here, not in 
the Philippine Islands. The Everett Steaitiship receivable on the 
other hand was situated in the Philippine Islands/ but with regard 
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to that asset, the defendants got more than their share. They 
received $100,000.00 each, which was more than they were entitled 
to under Mr. Grimm's Philippine Will. (PX. 169B; TRA. 358; DX. 
229). (b) Certainly, the defendants were not injured by their 
payment of a portion of the bribe to the Philippine taxing author-
ities over Maxine's objection that they arranged, orchestrated and 
lied about. (TRA. 203-208; TRB. 71, 938), The payment of a bribe 
is hardly the foundation of an equitable estoppel. (c) Typical of 
the defendants' misleading assertions and citations, is their 
complaint Maxine borrowed $500,000.00 from Globe Investment. The 
FSA had nothing to do with her ability to borrow the money from 
Globe. Without the FSA, Globe was an American asset in which 
Ethel and Nita had no interest. But what is misleading is that 
the defendants fail to point out — Maxine paid the money back — 
all $500,000.00 of it with interest. (TRA. 309). (d) Finally, 
the defendants make repeated references to the benefits that the 
plaintiffs received under the FSA. There are two simple answers 
to those assertions. The first is the plaintiffs never received 
anything under the FSA that they were not entitled to under Mr. 
Grimm's estate plan, and second, the test for equitable estoppel 
is not whether the plaintiffs benefit, but whether the defendants 
were injured. 
The fundamental answer to the defendants' claim of equit-
able estoppel is that the plaintiffs never did or said anything to 
prevent the defendants from seeking court approval of the FSA and 
that the defendants did not, contrary to the claims in their 
brief, compromise either their monetary or legal positions by 
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reason of the FSA or any conduct of the plaintiffs in conformity 
with the FSA. 
II. 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THE 
DEFENDANTS HAD NO RIGHT TO &150.000 IN 
ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER THE FSA ON THE GROUND 
THE FSA WAS NOT BINDING PRIOR TO COURT APPROVAL 
The lower court correctly rejected the defendants' appli-
cation for $150/000 in attorneys' fees under the FSA on the ground 
the FSA was not binding prior to court approval. The defendants 
are overly modest in their cross appeal. The defendants fail to 
mention the amount of attorneys' fees requested. The defendants 
claimed attorneys' fees in this case in the amount of $149/490. 
The defendants claimed attorneys' fees not only for Ethel and Nita 
4 
but for Rex. (Aff. R. Brent Stephens, dated 9/6/85). 
The only basis for a claim of attorneys' fees by any of 
the defendants was the FSA which provided in paragraph 14C for 
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party "in the event of any legal 
action . . . to enforce . . . this agreement." (PX. 58 at 12). 
All of the legal services for which the defendants sought an 
attorneys' fee award had been performed, of course, prior to the 
lower court's approval of the FSA. The lower court rejected the 
defendants' application on the ground that the defendants could 
not seek to enforce the attorneys' fee provision of the FSA prior 
to court approval of the FSA. 
4Rex, of course, was not a party to the FSA. (PX. 58 and 59). 
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The lower court was correct in holding the FSA was not 
enforceable prior to court approval. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1101. 
The lower court, however, was fundamentally inconsistent and wrong 
in holding the court could approve the FSA despite the plaintiffs* 
uncontroverted prior repudiation. The correct rule dispositive of 
both the defendants' cross appeal and the plaintiffs' appeal is 
that a settlement agreement, including an FSA, subject to court 
approval is not binding and is subject to repudiation prior to 
court approval. 
III. 
THE CO-EXECUTORS OF MR. GRIMM'S PHILIPPINE WILL, 
CHARLES PARSONS AND BYRON S. HUIE, WERE "INTERESTED 
PERSONS" ENTITLED TO NOTICE PURSUANT TO § 75-3-1102(c) 
The defendants concede in their brief that under the 
approval structure of § 1102 notice must be given to all 
"interested persons." (Res. Br. at 59). They further concede 
that notice was not given to Charles Parsons and Byron S. Huie 
designated by Mr. Grimm as co-executors of his Philippine Will. 
(PX. 7 at 5; see App. Br. at 47-48 with citations). 
The defendants claim that Mr, Parsons and Mr. Huie were 
not interested persons because Maxine and LaVar Tate were 
appointed as supervised personal representatives of Mr. Grimm's 
estate by stipulation in the lower court (PR. 58) and that the 
Philippine proceeding "was handled as an intestate matter." (Res. 
Br. at 60). The defendants' position is that while they concede 
that Mr. Parsons and Mr. Huie were designated by Mr. Grimm as 
co-executors in his Philippine Will and that Mr. Parsons and Mr. 
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Huie did not receive notice pursuant to § 1102(c), the failure of 
such notice is of no consequence because Mr. Parsons and Mr. Huie 
were not in fact appointed as personal representatives of Mr. 
Grimm's estate. 
The defendants' position both ignores the definition of 
the Probate Code defining "interested persons" and the circum-
stances regarding the appointments of supervised personal repre-
sentatives in the lower court and the Philippine proceedings. 
Contrary to the defendants' position, § 75r-l-201(20) specifically 
defines "interested persons" to include Mr. Huie and Mr. Parsons 
— "It also includes persons having priority for appointment as 
personal representative . . . ." 75-1-201(20) (emphasis 
supplied). Persons designated in a will as co-executors are 
persons having priority for appointment. Section 75-3-203. The 
definition of "interested persons" under the Uniform Probate Code 
thus is not whether in fact someone is appointed as a personal 
representative but whether a person has priority to be appointed 
as a personal representative, and persons designated by will have 
such priority. The standard, of course, makes great sense in the 
context of the approval of a family settlement agreement because 
without notice to a person having priority! for appointment, there 
would be no opportunity for such person to oppose approval of the 
settlement and there would be nothing to bind such person from 
proceeding in other jurisdictions — the Philippines, Hong Kong, 
Japan — with the probate of a testamentary devise inconsistent 
with a global settlement agreement. 
The circumstances and limitations, moreover, with regard 
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to the appointment of the supervised personal representatives 
below demonstrate as a practical matter that Mr. Huie and Mr. 
Parsons were interested persons. It is true that Maxine and LaVar 
Tate were pursuant to stipulation appointed as supervised personal 
representatives of Mr. Grimm's estate in the lower court. (PR. 
60-57). The order appointing Maxine and Mr. Tate, however, 
specifically limited their power with regard to Mr. Grimm's estate 
to deal with property located in Utah or in the United States of 
America. The order appointing the supervised personal represent-
atives provided in material part: " . . . the authority and power 
of the supervised personal representatives, E. LaVar Tate and 
Maxine Tate Grimm, is limited and restricted to dealing with the 
real and personal property of the decedent, Edward Miller Grimm, 
which is located in the State of Utah, or in the United States of 
America. . . .H (PR. 58) (emphasis supplied)). The restriction 
on the power of the supervised personal representatives appointed 
below precluding them from dealing with any property of the estate 
outside of the United States reinforces, as a practical matter, 
that persons designated by Mr. Grimm as co-executors of his 
Philippine Will were interested persons within § 1102(c). 
Certainly the course of the proceedings in the lower court 
recognized that Mr. Parsons and Mr. Huie were interested persons 
because they indeed did receive notice of the Petition for Probate 
and Appointment of Supervised Personal Representatives. Yet, they 
received no notice of the defendants' petition to approve the 
FSA. (PR. 24; App. Br. at 47-48 with citations). 
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The defendants' claim that Mr. Huie and Mr. Parsons were 
not interested persons because the proceedings in the Philippines 
were intestate proceedings is outrageous. The proceedings in the 
Philippines were commenced as intestate proceedings because Ethel 
filed a perjurious petition that Mr. Grimm had died intestate and 
that she was the only resident heir in the Philippines. (PX. 79 
and 80; see App. Br. at 18-20 with citations). Maxine unequivo-
cally objected to Ethel's appointment. (PX. 88; App. Br. at 20-21 
with citations). After the execution of the FSA the proceedings 
in the Philippines were not conducted as intestate proceedings but 
were conducted pursuant to the FSA. (DX. 214). A proceeding pur-
suant to an FSA cannot be used to deny status as interested 
persons to co-executors of a will displaced by an FSA in a § 1102 
proceeding to approve the FSA. That bootstrap rationale would 
avoid the very reason for notice to "interested persons" before 
court approval of a FSA. 
IV. 
THE PLAINTIFFS1 RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL 
A. The Plaintiffs Had a Right to Trial By Jury on the Issues of 
Duress and Failure of Consideration, 
The defendants' arguments to avoid the plaintiffs' 
constitutional right to jury trial on the issues of duress and 
failure of consideration simply boil down to a contention that the 
court could decide those issues first even though those issues 
were presented for trial both by the defendants' $10,000/000 
counterclaim for breach of the FSA and the plaintiffs' claims to 
set aside the FSA. The defendants contend the lower court avoided 
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the plaintiffs' right to jury trial on the issues of duress and 
failure of consideration by determining the validity of the FSA 
and ordering its enforcement so that the court never had to reach 
the defendants' $10,000,000 counterclaim for breach of contract. 
(Res. Br. at 62). The defendants are partially correct. The 
court did decide the issue of validity first, including the issues 
of duress and failure of consideration. (TRB. 1125; Findings Nos. 
43, 65, 66, 67 and 69, CR. 1240-1235). But, that is the problem 
not the answer. 
The validity of the FSA in terms of duress and failure of 
consideration was at issue both for purposes of the plaintiffs' 
5 
claims and the defendants' counterclaim. When the same issues 
are raised both in equitable and legal claims, the constitutional 
right to trial by jury under Article I, Section 10 of the Utah 
State Constitution requires the legal claims be tried to a jury 
first. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & 
Implement. Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981) ("The Court rejected the 
contention that there was no jury right when a claim for damages 
was only incidental to the injunctive relief sought, and held that 
a jury trial should be accorded the parties on the issues of fact 
raised in a legal cause of action when legal relief is sought in 
2 
conjunction with equitable relief. " Id. at 421). The precise 
problem is that the court decided the issues of duress 
^Duress and failure of consideration, of course, go to 
the question of the validity of the FSA. In the Matter of the 
Estate of Frank Chasel, supra, at 421. 
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and failure of consideration first. In doing SO/ the court 
violated the plaintiffs' right to trial by jury. 
The desperation of the defendants' position is 
demonstrated by the defendants' hypothetical. (Res. Br. at 62). 
The defendants postulate "Assume that 'X' sues 'Y' for breach of 
contract alleging damages. 'Y' answers by stating the contract is 
invalid for a number of reasons. 'X' decides to dismiss the 
lawsuit against 'Y'. 'Y' has no right . . . to require the trial 
proceed so that he can assert his affirmative defenses." (Res. 
Br. at 62-63). But, the defendants did not dismiss their 
$10/000/000 counterclaim before trial. They went to trial on that 
counterclaim/ putting at issue plaintiffs' affirmative defenses of 
duress and failure of consideration. The right to jury trial is 
determined by the claims and issues submitted for trial, not by 
the court's decision after trial. 
B. Maxine Was Entitled to a Jury Trial on Her Claim of 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 
Before turning to the defendants' attempt to avoid 
Maxine's right to trial by jury on her claim for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress/ the first point to be made is 
that Maxine is entitled to an adjudication of her claim. 
There is absolutely no question that the lower court 
simply did not adjudicate her claim. The lower court did not 
grant the defendants' motion for a directed verdict. (TRB. 
1121-1127). The lower court at the close of the evidence simply 
stated/ "The court finds the case in favor of the defendants and 
against the plaintiffs" (TRB. 1125/ 1121) and that it would 
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Hsubmit a memorandum as to my decision" (TRB. 1125/ 1121). The 
lower court never prepared the memorandum and the findings and 
conclusions of the court simply don't mention let alone adjudicate 
Maxine's claim for the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. On the failure of adjudication alone, Maxine has a 
right to a new trial on her claim and that trial by constitutional 
right must be a trial by jury. 
The defendants attempt to avoid Maxine's right to jury 
trial on her claim for the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress by arguing (1) Maxine has failed to make out a prima 
facie case under Utah law (Res. Br. at 64-68); a party has no 
right to jury trial when equitable issues ••predominate" (Res. Br. 
at 68-70); (3) Philippine law, not Utah law, is applicable and 
that Philippine law does not recognize a claim for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (Res. Br. at 64); and (4) somehow 
Maxine waived her right to trial by jury by not excepting to the 
court's ruling at the end of trial finding "in favor of the 
defendants and against the plaintiffs." (Res. Br. at 70). 
The defendants first two points do not require further 
argument. The plaintiffs have set forth in detail the overwhelm-
ing evidence supporting Maxinefs claim for the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress in their opening brief (App. Br. at 
50-51), and defendants' assertion that the test of the right to 
6The defendants concede there was no finding by the 
lower court with regard to Maxine's claim for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. (See Res. Br. at 65). 
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jury trial is whether equitable claims "predominate" is simply not 
the law. Compare International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer 
Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981) with Colman v. 
Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981). 
The defendants' arguments with regard to Philippine law 
are wholly specious: 
1. The defendants did not prove, cite or do anything 
else to establish Philippine law with regard to the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress in the lower court and the lower 
court, contrary to Rule 44(f), made no findings with regard to 
Philippine law. Rule 44(f), Utah Rules of Civ. Proc. ("the law of 
such . . . foreign country is to be determined by the court . . . 
and included in the findings"). 
2. The rule in Utah and the uniform rule is that in the 
absence of the proof of foreign law, foreign law is presumed to be 
the same as the law of the forum. Maple v. Maple, 566 P.2d 1229 
(Utah 1977) ("The rule is that unless the law of a foreign juris-
diction is proved to be otherwise, it will be presumed to be the 
same as the law of the forum state." Id. at 1230); Whitmore 
Oxygen Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 196 P.2d 976 (Utah 1948); 
Wachs v. Winter, 569 F. Supp. 1438 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
3. It is by no means clear that Philippine law should 
apply since Maxine was in Utah when the Roberts commenced their 
campaign of outrageous conduct to coerce M&xine into an FSA. She 
was in Utah when Ethel obtained her appointment as a special 
administratrix through a perjurious petition, when Ethel and Rex 
broke into her home and took her possessions and when she made a 
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written demand that Ethel relinquish her appointment and return 
her property, (See, App. Br. at 18-21 with citations; and see 
particularly PX. 79, 80, 82, 84, 85 and 88). The choice of law 
rules reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts is that 
the law of the place of injury will usually determine whether the 
actor's conduct was tortious. See, Restatement (Second) of 
Conflicts, §§ 145, 156. 
4. Most importantly, the defendants' assertion as to 
Philippine law according to the authority on which they rely is 
wrong. To establish Philippine law, the defendants rely on J. 
Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 513-528 (1973). (See 
Res. Br. at 64). But if the defendants had simply called the 
court's attention to the authority they cite, it transparently 
does not support their position but supports Maxine's claim. On 
pages 513 and 514 Sangco discusses damages for mental anguish or 
suffering. He states: 
Generally, damages for mental anguish are limited 
to cases in which there has been a personal 
physical injury or where the defendant wilfully, 
wantonly, recklessly, or intentionally caused the 
mental anguish . . . . Nor will damages be 
generally awarded for mental anguish which is not 
accompanied by a physical injury,, at least, where 
maliciousness, wantonness or intentional conduct 
is not involved. A number of recent cases, 
however, have held that damages for mental anguish 
will be allowed in a proper case even though not 
accompanied by physical injury. Id. at 514 
(emphasis supplied). 
In short, the authority that the defendants cite supports Maxine's 
claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress even 
under Philippine law and supports Mr. Sangco's conclusion 
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••. . . our law on the subject is becoming more and more indis-
tinguishable/ with very few exceptions, from the Anglo-American 
tort law." Id, at 8. 
The defendants are not only wrong in their assertions of 
Philippine law, they have not relied on the sources for Philippine 
law that would establish that law pursuant to Rule 44(f). Rule 
44(f) in a civil code country requires Ha copy of a statute" to 
determine foreign law and does not permit the proof of foreign law 
solely by secondary sources. Indeed, this is a classic case for 
the admonition of the Advisory Committee to the Utah Rules of 
Evidence which has cautioned that in determining foreign law 
H
. . . the foreign law of some jurisdictions might best be left 
proved through witnesses if resort to sources available in the 
State of Utah is questionable." See Advisory Committee Note to 
Rule 201/ Utah Rules of Evidence. The admonition of the Advisory 
Committee is particularly appropriate where the defendants made 
absolutely no attempt to establish foreign law in the lower court. 
The defendants1 attempt to claim that Maxine waived her 
right to jury trial is another kitchen sink effort by the 
defendants. (Res. Br. at 70-71). There was no such waiver. The 
plaintiffs filed a timely demand for trial by jury. (CR. 
873-871). A jury was impaneled (TRA. 3) and the plaintiffs 
steadfastly maintained their right to jury trial on Maxine's claim 
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress in argument 
both before trial and on the hearing on the defendants' motion for 
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directed verdict at the close of the plaintiffs' case. (TR. 
Hearings July 26 and 30, 1985 and TRB. 843). At the close of 
evidence the court simply ruled in favor of the defendants and 
against the plaintiffs (TRB. 1125, 1121) and dismissed the jury. 
(TRB. 1125). The court never gave any reason for its decision, 
never produced its promised memorandum and the plaintiffs were not 
required to take exception to the court's adverse ruling in order 
to preserve Maxine's right to jury trial on her claim for. the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
V. 
THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT ASSERT CLAIMS, 
THEY DID NOT HAVE BONA FIDE CLAIMS AND 
THE FORBEARANCE OF NONASSERTED MERIT-
LESS CLAIMS, COUPLED WITH OUTRAGEOUS 
CONDUCT, DOES NOT SUPPORT A DETERMINA-
TION OF GOOD FAITH CONTROVERSY 
The defendants acknowledge that the lower court adopted a 
subjective good faith rather than an objective bona fide or 
reasonable claim standard in determining whether the forbearance 
of claims can constitute adequate consideration for an FSA. The 
plaintiffs' position is that only the forbearance of bona fide or 
reasonable claims can constitute adequate consideration. (Compare 
7At the hearing on the motion for directed verdict at the 
close of plaintiffs' case, counsel for the plaintiffs told the 
court, "But the one issue I don't want your Honor to overlook in 
this case# there is a claim for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. And, your Honor, there is a prima facie 
showing" (TRB. 843). Defendants responded in part, "With respect 
to the claim for infliction of emotional distress . . . our 
position simply is that there is no jury question on that issue." 
(TRB. 862). 
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App. Br. at 54-64 with Res. Br. at 72-82). Meritless claims, 
claims without merit in fact or law, cannot under the great weight 
of authority serve as consideration to justify the alteration of a 
testator's estate plan. The defendants concede that the 
plaintiffs have adequately discussed this issue in their opening 
brief and no further argument or reply is required. 
The defendants, however, do not discuss and do not reply 
to other critical arguments of the plaintiffs' addressed to the 
failure of consideration. The defendants do not question or 
respond to the uncontroverted fact that the defendants never 
asserted any claim for more to Mr. Grimm's estate prior to the 
execution of the FSA. (App. Br. at 61-64 with citations). The 
plaintiffs' point is three-fold. One is that the defendants' own 
testimony, the testimony of Ethel, Rex and their lawyer, Donald 
Holbrook, is they never asserted any claim, whether a bona fide 
claim or a good faith claim, to Mr. Grimm's estate prior to the 
execution of the FSA. Id. Second, without the assertion of a 
claim, the forbearance of a claim cannot constitute the bargained 
for consideration for a FSA. Id. Third, without the assertion of 
a claim, no logical determination can be made that the defendants 
in good faith believed they had a claim to Mr. Grimm's estate or 
to put the proposition directly, if the defendants in good faith 
believed they had claims to Mr. Grimm's estate, however meritless, 
they would have asserted them. 
The point is not academic. Take the defendants' position 
that they had a bona fide claim as compulsory heirs under the law 
of legitime to Mr. Grimm's estate. (Compare App. Br. at 59-61 
-39-
with Res. Br. at 79-82). But that claim not only was without 
merit# that claim was never asserted. (See App. Br. at 61-64 with 
citations). That not only is the testimony of Ethel/ Rex and 
their lawyer/ Donald Holbrook (Id.), it is reflected in a letter 
from Mr. Holbrook. On April 6# 1978/ Holbrook wrote Rex Roberts 
stating in part: 
From time to time we have been advised that your 
Philippine lawyers have researched the Philippine 
laws of succession. As soon as possible, we 
would appreciate all the information they can 
provide on this subject. (DX. 308). 
No information relative to the law of legitime claim was ever 
furnished Mr. Holbrook — none. But/ more importantly/ by April 
6/ 1978/ the basic deal for the division of Mr. Grimm's estate 
under the FSA already had been extracted from Maxine by Ethel and 
Rex in the Philippines. (PX. 95/ 92/ 96/ 190; TRB. 236/ 240-42/ 
245-46/ 915-916/ 642/ 654-55). If the defendants in good faith 
believed Ethel and Nita were compulsory heirs, they would have 
furnished Mr. Holbrook with the promised legal research and they 
would have asserted the claim. 
The defendants not only did not assert any claim for more 
to Mr. Grimm's estate prior to the execution of the FSA/ they had 
no bona fide claim asserted or unasserted. The defendants now 
raise three possible claims for more to Mr. Grimm's estate —- the 
invalidity of his divorce/ the invalidity of his trust and a claim 
they were compulsory heirs under the law of legitime. None of 
these claims has any merit/ (see App. Br. at 56-57 with 
citations)/ and the lower court did not find that any of these 
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claims were meritorious. (CR. 1254-1231). 
1. The decree of divorce awarded Juanita from Mr. Grimm 
after her appearance and trial was not subject to collateral 
attack 30 years later. (See App. Br. at 58 with citations; 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 31 (1982)). Under the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, a judgment whose purpose is to 
determine a change in a person's marital status is conclusive upon 
the parties to the action and under Nevada law a divorce that is 
binding upon the parties may not be contested or attacked by third 
persons not parties to the action. Nevada Revised Statutes, 
125.185; Gutowskv v. Gutowsky, 238 N.Y.S. 2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1963). 
2. The plaintiffs have previously discussed the 
defendants' spurious attacks on the validity of Mr. Grimm's 
Trust. (Br. supra at 13-20). There was no bona fide claim, 
contrary to the defendants' position, that Mr. Grimm's trust was 
illusory, that the assets he intended to place in the trust were 
not validly transferred, or that under a valid spendthrift trust a 
beneficiary may only receive income and not the corpus. Id.. 
3. The defendants had no valid claim that they were 
compulsory heirs under the law of legitime. The issue has nothing 
to do with the Philippines accepting the renvoi based on Mr. 
Grimm's domicile. The issue turns on the Philippine law of 
succession after accepting the renvoi. The law of succession in 
the Philippines established at trial by the controlling statute 
and eminent counsel is that under Article 16 of the Philippine 
Code, the children of American citizens domiciled in the 
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Philippines are not compulsory heirs• (See App. Br, at 59-61 with 
o 
citations). 
The failure of the defendants to assert any claim and the 
lack of merit to the claims the defendants now assert not only 
demonstrates there was no bargained for consideration and no bona 
fide claim, these factors also demonstrate that the defendants did 
not assert any claim in good faith. If the defendants' claims 
were without merit, if they never did any research to substantiate 
a claim, as their lawyer requested, there is no reasonable basis 
for any good faith belief in those claims, You cannot profess 
good faith without reason or simply close your eyes to the truth. 
If the defendants did not assert their claims, there is further 
reason to question their good faith belief in those claims. 
Indeed, one of the cutting questions to the defendants' professed 
good faith is if they really believed these claims were good faith 
claims, why didn't they assert them in the court below? If they 
had any claims for more to Mr. Grimm's estate, why didn't they 
plead those claims as alternative claims to the FSA for a greater 
participation in Mr. Grimm's estate? When the failure of the 
defendants to assert claims prior to the FSA and the meritless 
8Mr. Angara's telegram to Mr. Salisbury of February 17, 
1978, is categorically consistent with Mr. Binavince's testimony 
— "Under Philippine law, the order of succession, the amount of 
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of the testamentary 
provisions are regulated by the national law of the decedent, 
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the 
country wherein said property may be found . . . ." (DX. 253 at 
3007). 
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nature of the claims they now assert are coupled with the 
defendants' outrageous conduct — Ethel's perjurious petition and 
Ethel's and Rex's break in to Maxine's home — in securing the 
FSA, how can there be any basis for a determination that the 
defendants asserted claims in good faith or that this was a 
compromise of a good faith controversy as required by the Uniform 
Probate Code? See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1102. People who act in 
good faith do not need to resort to that type of conduct. 
VI. 
THE DEFENDANTS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO 
RESPOND TO THE PLAINTIFFS' CHALLENGE 
TO THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINQS 
The defendants simply have been unable to respond to the 
plaintiffs' detailed attack on the inadequacies of the lower 
court's findings. (Compare App. Br. at 64-73 with Res. Br. at 
82-83) The defendants literally do not respond to any of the 
substantial and serious challenges to the lower court's findings 
raised by the plaintiffs. (Id.). These points need to be made 
with regard to the defendants' attempt to avoid the serious issues 
the plaintiffs have raised with regard to the inadequacy of the 
lower court's findings: 
1. The defendants acknowledge that the lower court, 
eight months after trial, without any prior articulation of the 
grounds or reasons for its decision and even before all of the 
evidence had been transcribed, adopted virtually verbatim the 
findings and conclusions proposed by the defendants. (Res. Br. at 
82-83). This practice destroys the foundation for the standard 
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deference to the factual determinations below and warrants a full 
and fair review of the plaintiffs' carefully documented challenges 
to the lower courts findings. 
2o The defendants attempt to dismiss the plaintiffs' 
carefully documented Statement of Facts by merely claiming the 
lower court resolved conflicts in the evidence against the 
plaintiffs. (See App. Br. at 10-31 and at 64-73). The defendants 
do not point to one single factual assertion in the plaintiffs' 
Statement of Facts as unfounded or unsupported by the plaintiffs' 
citation to transcript and exhibit. The plaintiffs in their 
opening brief based their Statement of Facts, not on the 
plaintiffs' version of the evidence, but on the testimony of the 
defendants, the defendants' witnesses and written exhibits. There 
is not a single critical assertion of fact contained in the 
plaintiffs' Statement of Facts that is not based on either the 
testimony of the defendants, the defendants' witnesses or the 
9 
written exhibits. The plaintiffs invite this Court's careful 
review of its citations to the record. 
3. The defendants do not respond to the principal 
criticism the plaintiffs raise with regard to the lower court's 
findings. The plaintiffs pointed out in their opening brief, "The 
principal failure of the lower court's findings is its omissions 
or failure to decide subsidiary or subordinate facts that were 
defendants' principal witnesses were the defendants 
Ethel and Rex Roberts, Donald Holbrook and David Salisbury. 
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submitted for its adjudication." (App. Br. at 65). The 
defendants have absolutely no response to the plaintiffs' detailed 
attack on the lower court's failure to decide subsidiary or 
subordinate facts submitted for its adjudication. The lower court 
cannot discharge its Rule 52 responsibility by simply avoiding the 
adjudication of significant controverted factual issues. (See 
App. Br. at 65-73 with citations). 
4. The defendants attempt to create the appearance of 
support for the lower court's findings by having their Statement 
of Facts purportedly represent an annotation of the lower court's 
determinations. But the critical findings of the lower court are 
not supported by the record or by the defendants' citation to the 
record. The plaintiffs will not reargue the numerous inaccuracies 
in the court's findings that the plaintiffs have previously 
documented. (See App. Br. at 64-73 and at 10-31 with citations). 
Two critical examples/ however, make the point. Two of the, if 
not the two most significant, events leading up to the signing of 
the FSA were Ethel's perjurious petition to gain control of her 
father's estate in the Philippines and Ethel's and Rex' burglary 
of Maxine's home. Certainly, the defendants' willingness to go to 
such lengths to obtain an FSA are significant for the purposes of 
determining whether this FSA was a compromise of a good faith 
controversy and in assessing the quality of the coercion the 
Roberts subjected Maxine to in order to obtain an FSA. The lower 
court's findings relating to Ethel's perjurious petition are set 
forth in Finding No. 30 and the lower court's findings with regard 
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to the Roberts' burglary of Maxine's home are set forth in Finding 
No. 31. (CR. 1247-46). 
(a) With regard to Ethel's perjurious petition, the 
lower court, first, simply abdicated its responsibility and made 
absolutely no determination whether the critical verified 
assertions of that petition were perjurious. (See App. Br. at 
18-20 and at 67-68 with citations). The court did find that 
Ethel's appointment as Special Administratrix -was in accord with 
Mr. Salisbury's recommendation.- The defendants purport to cite 
record support for this finding. (See Res. Br. at 15). The 
defendants' citations lend absolutely no support to this finding. 
The finding that Ethel acted on Salisbury's recommendations is as 
false as Ethel's petition. Mr. Salisbury made no such 
recommendation. Mr. Salisbury had not even met Maxine on December 
29, 1977 when Ethel filed her perjurious petition. (See PX. 79, 
88, 174; TRB. 223). The fact that Mr. Salisbury had not even met 
Maxine, and had absolutely nothing to do with the estate on 
December 29, 1977, is supported by the testimony of David 
Salisbury and his office records. (PX. 174; TRB. 223). 
(b) With regard to the Roberts' burglary of Maxine's 
home, the court determined the Roberts -visited- Maxine's home and 
removed her possessions -for safekeeping.- The Roberts 
burglarized Maxine's home. Even the lower court found that they 
removed Maxine's possessions "without express permission.- The 
findings, however, that the Roberts merely -visited- Maxine's home 
and removed property for -safekeeping- are outrageous. The 
Roberts had Maxine's phone number in Utah but never called. (TRB. 
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638). Maxine's home was guarded in the same manner that it had 
been guarded for 30 years. (TRA. 111-115). Certainly# the 
Roberts had never attempted to Hvisitw Maxine's home and remove 
her property while Mr. Grimm was alive. (TRB. 20). The Roberts 
cleaned out Maxine's home. (TRA. 111-115; TRB. 20-25). They even 
removed a safe that was so big it required 3 men to haul it away. 
(TRB. 23-25). Some HvisitM. As for "safekeeping", the Roberts 
refused to return Maxine's property after written demand, after 
she returned to the Philippines, they told her they would not 
return her property until she signed an FSA and did not do so. 
(PX. 88; TRB. 636-641, 936-937, 1009, 17-25; TRA. 118) 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants' cross-appeal for attorneys• fees should 
be denied and the Judgment of the lower court should be reversed 
with instructions in accordance with the questions presented and 
the precise relief sought by the plaintiffs-appellants in their 
opening brief. 
DATED this day of June, 198f7. 
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